






THE POST COLD WAR CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS:






Thesis Advisor: Richard Doyle




REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form . [pproved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden Poi this collection ol information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time lor renewing instruction, searching existing data
sources gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information Send comments regarding this burden estimate oi anj oth i
aspect ol this collection ol information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services. Directorate tor Information Operations and
Reports. 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204. Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-01 XX)
Washington DC 20503
1 AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
December 1997
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE POST (OLD WAR CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS: WHAT HAS
CHANGED ANDWHY
6. AUTHOR(S)
Tony L Amnions, Jr
5. RNDINCM MBERS





9. SPONSORING MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESSfES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the US Government
12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
12b. DISTRIBUTION (ODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
With the end of the Cold War the military services have experienced significant cuts in endstrength. Within the Navy, the Civil
Engineer Corps (CEC) has also experienced some reductions. This thesis sought to determine how CEC endstrength is derived and
whether it declined commensurate with overall naval officer endstrength The command and billet structures for the CEC in 1986
and 1996 were used to represent the Cold War and Post Cold War respectively The thesis determined how the CEC has changed
and compared these changes to those that occurred in the larger naval officer community. One major finding is that CEC
endstrength is indirectly affected by naval officer endstrength and directly affected by the size of the infrastructure. Downsizing the
military without downsizing infrastructure results in minor reductions in CEC endstrength. The CEC has experienced a 17 percent
reduction in endstrength over the period, with more than 50 percent attributed to the closure of commands. Another finding is that
these reductions have not changed the missions of the CEC, construction contract management, facilities maintenance, and
advanced base construction
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Civil Engineer Corps, Seabees, Military Downsizing















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2 89)
Prescribed bv ANSI Sid. 239 18
11
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THE POST COLD WAR CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS:
WHAT HAS CHANGED AND WHY
Tony L. Amnions, Jr.
Lieutenant, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy
B.S., Virginia Military Institute, 1988
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of









With the end of the Cold War the military services have
experienced significant cuts in endstrength. Within the
Navy, the Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) has also experienced
some reductions. This thesis sought to determine how CEC
endstrength is derived and whether it declined commensurate
with overall naval officer endstrength. The command and
billet structures for the CEC in 1986 and 1996 were used to
represent the Cold War and Post Cold War respectively. The
thesis determined how the CEC has changed and compared these
changes to those that occurred in the larger naval officer
community. One major finding is that CEC endstrength is
indirectly affected by naval officer endstrength and
directly affected by the size of the infrastructure.
Downsizing the military without downsizing infrastructure
results in minor reductions in CEC endstrength. The CEC has
experienced a 17 percent reduction in endstrength over the
period, with more than 50 percent attributed to the closure
of commands. Another finding is that these reductions have
not changed the missions of the CEC, construction contract
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The purpose of this research paper is to investigate
the effect of downsizing due to the fall of the Soviet Union
and the resulting smaller force structure on the Civil
Engineer Corps (CEC) . This will be accomplished by looking
at CEC endstrength as it compares to DoN endstrength,
followed by an in depth look at the CEC to identify where
cuts have been made. Additionally, an assessment will be
made as to the rationale for reduction in the different
functional areas of the CEC that make up the overall cuts.
B . BACKGROUND
Until the late 1980' s, the United States military was
sized and structured to fight the Cold War against a known
adversary, the Soviet Union. U.S. military policy depended
upon technological advances and a large standing force
structure. The emphasis was on deterrence, failing which,
U.S. strategy was to prevail through the application of
conventional weapons. During this period the military grew
in size, particularly while President Reagan was in office.
This growth peaked in the mid to late 1980' s.
It is about this time that Communism faltered and the
Cold War came to an end. In response, the U.S. military has
faced uncertainty regarding its purpose, and hence its size
and structure. Significant cuts in endstrength have been
taken during this period.
The entire DoD has felt this wave of shrinkage and the
CEC is no different. It is not unreasonable to assume that
reduced forces allow for a reduction in CEC billets, on the
assumption that there is a direct correlation between the
size of the overall U.S. defense force and the size of the
CEC . But this may not be the best approach. Should the CEC
size and structure be related directly to personnel
endstrength of the entire Navy or should it be connected to
infrastructure? And what of the increase in the number of
operations other than war (OOTW) , base closures and
increased scrutiny of environmental policies and contracting
requirements? Are these not also determinants of the
appropriate size and structure of the CEC? The Quadrennial
Defense Review of 1997 has requested further base closures,
illustrating that the infrastructure is too large. Until
infrastructure is reduced, this larger infrastructure may
require a CEC that is larger than may be expected to manage
it. It is unclear how this is managed currently, but it






How has the end of the Cold War and the subsequent
downsizing of the military affected the CEC size and
structure?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. How has the end of the Cold War affected the
mission of the CEC?
b. How are the size and structure of the CEC managed
in relation to the mission?
c. Who is managing the cuts in CEC endstrength and how
are the cuts being implemented?
d. Have the increased requirements for deployments to
regional conflicts, joint staffing, base closures, and
increased environmental awareness been considered in
the changes to the CEC structure?
D . SCOPE
The scope of the research will be limited to the CEC
billet structure from the end of the Cold War to the
present. Changes in endstrength and structure will be
analyzed to identify relationships to the changes in the
Navy as a whole and the CEC mission specifically. The
billet structures for 1986 and 1996 will be compared to




This research paper was accomplished predominately
through the analysis of past personnel management studies
and the authorized billet structure for the years of 1986
and 1996. Initially a count of the different types of
commands was made, followed by a billet count in each
functional area. The results of the two representative
years were then compared to determine where changes have
occurred. Interviews were then conducted with the CEC
billet manager at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. He is
responsible for managing the billet structure for the CEC
and ensuring that the appropriate number of developmental
billets are maintained. This is critical given the fact
that over 50 percent of the CEC billets are actually
programmed from Major Claimants other than the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC)
.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II will take a look at the establishment of the
CEC and why it was created. Core competencies of the CEC
will be reviewed, from the time of the creation of the CEC
to the present. The different functional areas of the CEC
will be presented and how each of these areas is staffed
will be determined.
Chapter III will discuss the size and structure of the
CEC during the Cold War. Each functional area of the CEC
will be reviewed to determine where the focus was at the
time .
Chapter IV will discuss the post Cold War CEC size and
structure as it relates to the current mission. Once again
each functional area will be broken out to determine if the
focus has changed.
Chapter V will illustrate the changes in the CEC
between 1986 and 1996. Each functional area will be
compared to determine where and why the CEC has downsized
and the apparent logic for these changes. The analysis will
also determine how the CEC downsizing compares to the Navy
as a whole over the same period.
Chapter VI will summarize the findings of prior
chapters, answer the research questions, and present
recommendations for further research.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This research paper will provide a clear and concise
depiction of the factors which have shaped the changes in
the CEC since the end of the Cold War. It will suggest
which factors are the most significant and indicate why.
This will enable the CEC to illustrate the methodology used
in implementing changes to the endstrength for the CEC when
the force structure of the entire military is changing. It
will prove useful as the DoN and the DoD continue to shape
the force to respond to changes in the post Cold War
security environment.

II. WHY A CEC
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will document the creation of the CEC, the
core competencies that make the CEC an integral part of the
Navy, and define the functional areas making up the CEC that
will be used throughout the remainder of this paper. This
discussion establishes the requirement for the CEC, with the
remainder of the paper addressing the size and structure for
the post Cold War drawdown.
B. CREATION OF THE CEC
1 . The Beginning
The CEC as an entity formally recognizes its creation
on 2 March, 1867. At this time it was determined by
Congress that Civil Engineers of the Navy were to be
appointed by the President. But this is not actually when
the CEC staff corps came to be, nor were these the first
engineers to work within the Navy Department.
Sixty-three years earlier the first "Engineer of the
Navy Department" was designated by President Jefferson.
Benjamin Henry Latrobe was selected to design and plan for
construction dry-docks that would house the fleet of twelve
frigates. He also began the Naval Shore Establishment by
designing Navy facilities in Washington, New York and
Norfolk. Thus began the first use of a Naval Engineer in
the planning and design of facilities. (Ref. 1)
Congress delayed until 1826 the construction of the
dry-docks. Loammi Baldwin was selected to oversee these
projects by the Navy and to be the "Superintendent of dry-
docks and inspector of Navy Yards". He in turn selected two
"resident engineers" to be his representative at each of the
dry-dock construction sites in Boston and Norfolk. This
began the construction management responsibility of the Navy
engineers. To this day civilian engineers in contracting
offices are titled "Resident Engineer in Charge of
Construction" while CEC officers in these billets are titled
"Resident Officer in Charge of Construction". (Ref. 1)
In 1842 the bureau system was established by Congress
and the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the precursor to the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) , was created.
This office was responsible for the oversight of all
facilities in the Navy. (Ref. 1)
In 1881 the President conferred "relative rank" on the
CEC and authorized the wearing of the regulation staff
officer uniform. These two steps marked the creation of an
actual staff corps within the Navy. Until this time all
engineers in the Navy were civilians. (Ref. 2)
After the Spanish-American War the Navy expanded its
base structure rapidly, including establishing bases
overseas in many of its new territories. In response,
Congress directed the CEC to be responsible for all Navy
public works in 1911. This placed the requirement on the
CEC to become proficient in the area of facilities
management. This expansion also drove an increase in CEC
officers. In 1898 there were ten officers, but at the
conclusion of World War I there were approximately 150.
Some of these increases were due to the war, but many were
required to manage the numerous bases that had been built
both overseas and at home. (Ref. 2)
World War II brought an opportunity for the CEC to grow
in its contribution to the Navy. Until this time the
engineers of the Navy were responsible for building and
managing facilities during times of peace. Little
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consideration for the CEC contributing to the war effort had
been made. World War II changed this perception. CEC
innovations for the war were instrumental in the allies'
success
.
Two of these developments were the sectional floating
dry-dock and the Navy pontoon. The sectional floating dry-
dock could be disassembled and transported to forward
locations for repair of ships on station, without having to
make the long transoceanic trip. The Navy pontoon was a
system of steel boxes that could be tied together to create
piers, barges, and bridges. The most important of its uses
though was to create a ship-to-shore causeway that allowed
amphibious landings over shallow beaches such as Sicily and
Normandy. (Ref. 2)
As revolutionary as these innovations were for the
times, the most critical did not occur until 1942. In
January of that year RADM Ben Moreell, Chief of the Bureau
of Yards and Docks, received authority to begin recruiting
the first Naval units in U.S. history to specifically
perform construction in overseas combat zones. (Ref. 2)
2 . The Seabees
It became apparent early in the war that civilian
contractors could not be counted on in combat zones. A
civilian defending himself under military law was considered
a guerrilla and was subject to summary execution if
captured. RADM Moreell saw the need for a construction unit
capable of building advanced bases, and they had to be
military personnel. In 1942 he began to recruit the first
Naval Construction Battalion (CB) , or Seabees as they were
soon labeled. This unit was to be led by the engineers of
the Navy, the CEC, creating the third major responsibility
of the Corps. (Ref. 2)
Experienced construction men were recruited, averaging
35 years in age, and placed in the Seabee units. They
received little training in Navy customs and traditions and
were the most unlikely-looking sailors ever introduced to
the Navy. They were brought to service to do one thing,
provide construction capabilities, and they did it well. In
a span of only three years, the Seabees constructed over 400
advanced bases in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. GEN
Douglas MacArthur once stated "The only trouble with Seabees
was that there weren't enough of them." (Ref. 2)
The Seabees continued this tradition of hard work
through Korea, Vietnam and Desert Shield/Storm. But the
Seabees have accomplished far more than contingency
construction; they have responded in times of peace.
Seabees have built bases around the world, including Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa, a floating dry-dock
for the Polaris Submarine Facility in Holy Lock, McMurdo
Station in the Antarctica, Cubi Point Naval Air Station in
the Philippines, and the Naval Station on Diego Garcia.
(Ref. 2)
The Seabees have supported the civilian populace as
well. The Seabees responded when Guam and Hawaii were hit
by typhoons and when South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi,
and Puerto Rico were devastated by hurricanes. Seabees
arrived only hours after the 1964 earthguake and tsunami
leveled the coast of Alaska and immediately following the
1987 earthquake in the Bay Area of California. Both Active
and Reserve Seabees have been seen across the country
fighting forest fires in National Parks and in communities
fighting the onslaught of rising waters of floods. (Ref. 3)
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3 . Today and Tomorrow
Over the almost 200 years since the establishment of
the Navy Department much has changed. There has been a
transition from sail to steam and from wood to steel. The
Navy has gone from a blue water force to an amphibious force
and back and forth again. But one thing stays constant
throughout history. When the war is won, ships must have a
base to return home to. And as long as there is a Navy,
there will be bases, and someone will have to be responsible
for building and maintaining them. Since 1804 the Navy
Engineer undertook this task, and in 1867 this group became
recognized as the CEC . The three primary functions of
construction management, facilities management and
contingency construction fluctuate in staffing levels as the
needs change. These needs, in turn, are a function of the
roles and missions assigned to the CEC at a specific point




To be successful in the CEC and capable of fulfilling
the needs of the Navy in the functional areas of
construction management, facilities management and
contingency construction, the CEC officer must have a set of
competencies pertinent to this end. The CEC is comprised of
a triad of Naval Officer, Engineer/Technical Professional,
and Acquisition/Business Professional. A different mix of
competencies is necessary to be successful in each
functional area and each of the three competencies requires






The most obvious need for Naval Civil Engineers to
also be officers lies in the fact that they will be in
"harm' s way" in the leadership of contingency construction
operations. A civilian would be unable to lead a unit of
the Naval Construction Force (NCF) into a combat zone.
A less visible aspect of this competency is the
fact that the core values of the Navy are brought to bear on
the ethical dilemmas faced in construction contract
management. The federal government confronts this issue in
all aspects of contracting. The fact that the CEC are
officers brings an expectation that decisions will be made
in the best interest of the country and not the individual.
(Ref. 4)
b. Credentials
The credentials of the naval officer consist of
the commission and warfare qualifications. Officers for the
CEC are commissioned from the Naval Academy, college ROTC
programs, and transfers from the line community.
Eligibility to become commissioned in the CEC requires a
baccalaureate degree from an accredited university in
engineering or architecture. Earning the warfare
qualification for the Seabee Combat Warfare Specialist
(SCWS) designation requires a tour with a Seabee unit and
demonstration of leadership and knowledge commensurate with
leading a unit in contingency construction operations.
(Ref. 4) Figure 1 illustrates the attainment of this
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All facets of the CEC require an ability as an
Engineer/Technical Professional. This is easily the most
visible of the three necessary competencies. The CEC
manages construction and maintenance of facilities and an
understanding of their design and function is critical to
successful completion of this mission. In construction
management the CEC officer oversees the building of
facilities by civilian contractors. In facilities
maintenance a comprehensive understanding of facility and
component operations is critical to the maintenance and
planned replacement to be accomplished. And in contingency
construction the officer becomes the project manager for
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work crews to plan and execute the construction of
facilities, after which maintaining them becomes his
responsibility. (Ref. 4)
b. Credentials
The credentials carried by the CEC officer that
reflect the competence in this area include the degrees held
and professional registration.
(1) Education. To be commissioned into
the CEC requires a BS in an engineering discipline or a BA
in architecture. But the CEC officer cannot stop there, as
many of the senior billets require subspecialty codes,
attained through graduate degree programs. CEC officers
hold MS degrees in each of the engineering disciplines,
construction management, financial management and operations
analysis. This compares favorably to the civilian sector of
engineers, who are also required to hold graduate degrees to
work at a similar level of facilities and construction
management. (Ref. 4) Figure 2 shows the attainment of
graduate degrees, with the associated subspecialty code, and
the percentage of billets requiring subspecialty codes at
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Figure 2: GRADUATE DEGREES IN THE CEC, 1996 (Ref. 5)
(2) Registration. The other credential--
professional registration—may be achieved in one of three
ways. Upon graduation from an accredited BS program in
engineering, an individual may apply to test to become an
Engineer in Training (EIT) . Once completing four years of
documented engineer work and attainment of the EIT
designation, an individual may test to become a Professional
Engineer (PE) . For architects, a very similar process
allows them to become a Registered Architect (RA) . These
levels of registration are identical to those held by
civilian engineers. This registration is critical to
maintaining the professionalism of the CEC community. (Ref.
4) Figure 3 shows the attainment of these registrations as
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Figure 3: REGISTRATION ATTAINED BY CEC, 1996 (Ref. 5)
4. Acquisition/Business Professional
a. Skills
While the CEC officer is predominately an engineer
by trade, it has become increasingly necessary that a
competence in acquisition and business be acquired. Not
only is the CEC responsible for the technical aspects of
construction management, but also for the contract planning,
formation, and administration associated with it. And not
only does the CEC officer maintain facilities, he must lead
a Public Works Office similar to those which support cities
and towns. Understanding how facilities and their
components work is only one aspect of what is needed. Being
a business strategist and a long range planner is also
necessary to succeed in the CEC. An aptitude for balancing
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and best utilizing resources such as funding and personnel
is critical. (Ref. 4)
b. Credentials
Credentials for this competency come in the form
of acquisition certification and membership in the
Acquisition Professional Community (APC)
.
(1) Certification. Acquisition certification
comes in three levels based on the completion of required
courses and number of years in acquisition billets. Each
level attained carries with it a responsibility and an
ability to accomplish specific types of contracting actions.
(Ref. 4)
(2) Acquisition Professional Community
(APC) . The APC is a group of individuals, selected annually
by a formal board, who meet very specific criteria of
training and experience. This select group makes up the
Navy's Acquisition Workforce and the individuals fill
acquisition critical billets. Failure to be a member of the
APC excludes individuals from filling these critical
billets, and limits their ability to function in a large
area of the CEC. The criteria that must be met are:
a. Lieutenant Commander/GS-13 level or above,
b. Accredited baccalaureate degree,
c. 24 semester credit hours in career field and
12 semester credit hours in business,
d. at least four years of federal government
acquisition experience,
e. At minimum meet the training requirements for
a Level II acquisition certification.
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These very strict requirements are intended
to ensure that the acquisition community is capable of
completing its mission. (Ref. 6) Figure 4 shows the
membership in the APC for the eligible ranks as of 30
September 1996. (Ref. 5)
Figure 4: APC MEMBERSHIP IN THE CEC, 1996 (Ref. 5)
5. Conclusions
The triad on which the core competencies are built is
critical to the accomplishment of the mission of the CEC.
Failure to attain an ability in any one of the three areas
results in a less than adequate officer. The leadership of
the Naval Officer, the technical expertise of the engineer,
and the acquisition expertise of the APC member make the CEC




The remainder of this paper will address certain
changes in the CEC from 1986 to 1996. To do this it is
necessary to break the CEC into components that may be
compared and analyzed. The requirements of construction
management, facilities management, and contingency
construction are the primary components for analysis. These
general areas are then compared to the billet structure for
the CEC to determine how that structure could be examined in
terms of its representation of the components. Four primary
functional areas and one residual emerged from this process:





Contracting commands were those within the NAVFAC
claimancy that perform contracting functions from award to
warranty close out or commands that support this function
directly. The billets in contracting are budgeted for
directly by the NAVFAC claimancy and currently make up
approximately 30 percent of the CEC. (Ref. 7) The size of
an office is driven by criteria such as number of contracts,
size of civilian staff, the amount and dispersion of
workload, and the number and size of the customers. (Ref.
8)
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Jb. Types of Commands and Billets
Commands and billets that fit into this area are
commonly referred to as Engineering Field Divisions (EFD)
,
Engineering Field Activities (EFA) , Officer in Charge of
Construction (OICC) , and Contracting Offices.
3. Public Works
a. Definition
Public works is a general term used to describe a
unit that provides facilities management. These offices are
responsible for the planning, budgeting, and execution of
the real property maintenance program at a command.
Services provided by a typical public works office include
utilities system and facilities maintenance, transportation
support, and environmental compliance. The billets for a
public works are budgeted for by the major claimant to which
they are assigned, with NAVFAC being the major claimant for
the Public Works Centers (PWC) . Staffing at public works
commands is determined by the funding level for real
property maintenance and the current plant replacement value
of all facilities managed. (Ref. 8)
It is critical that the CEC manage the public
works billets even though they are controlled by other
claimancies. Currently public works constitutes almost 35
percent of all CEC billets and much of the junior
developmental billets. (Ref. 7) At a time of downsizing
within all claimancies, it is important that the CEC is
represented strongly by the billet manager to ensure the CEC
does not take an inordinate number of cuts in its junior
billets, loss of which hinders the ability to develop well
rounded senior officers.
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b. Types of Commands and Billets
There were three major activities that fit into
the category of public works. The Public Works Center (PWC)
provides support to numerous bases in a fleet concentration
area, such as that seen in Norfolk or San Diego. The Public
Works Department (PWD) provides support to one base or large
command, such as NSA Monterey Bay or Port Hueneme . The
Staff Civil Engineer (SCE) provides support to a base or
large customer that is typically serviced by a PWC, such as
a hospital or a depot.
4 . Naval Construction Force (NCF)
a. Definition
Commands in the NCF category were those units that
provide contingency construction and maintenance to the Navy
and Marine Corps. These units forward deploy in times of
crisis and provide underwater, amphibious, and land based
construction capabilities. Typical projects include
construction and repair of airfields, roads, base camps,
ammunition supply points, and piers. The entire NCF is
budgeted for by the Commander in Chiefs of the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets. (Ref. 8) The NCF are the only truly
operational units during times of crisis for the CEC.
Currently the NCF makes up approximately 15 percent of the
entire CEC billet structure. (Ref. 7)
Jb. Types of Commands and Billets
All units providing naval construction
capabilities and support fit into this category. The list
includes Brigades, Regiments, Battalions, and Units, as well
21




All CEC billets assigned to support a staff fit
into this category, such as CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT.
Currently this area makes up about ten percent of the CEC.
(Ref. 7) Billets are budgeted for by the command being
supported. (Ref. 8)
Jb. Types of Commands and Billets
NAVFAC is by far the largest command with its
headquarters represented in this category. Other types of
staffs to which CEC officers are assigned include those for
other claimancies, joint staffs, the CNO staffs, and




This category was created to capture billets that
did not fit into the others and had little impact on the
outcome of this paper. Though this category made up about
ten percent of the CEC, it was in six fractured pieces that
accounted for no significant numbers individually. (Ref. 7)
ib. Types of Commands and Billets
This area included accessions, separations,
transients, students, instructors, and exchange billets.
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This number tends to fluctuate with the season, e.g., during
the summer the number of CEC accessions and students is




This chapter summarized the history of the CEC. The
competencies that comprise the CEC have been identified and
their roles within the Navy have been shown. Four distinct
and important functional areas- contracting, public works,
NCF, and staff, and a residual area (other) comprise the
modern CEC. The remainder of the thesis will examine the
changes in the size and structure of the CEC between 1986
and 1996, using these functional areas. This examination




III. THE COLD WAR CEC
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the CEC of the Cold War,
using 1986 as a representative year. The missions for the
Navy and the CEC will be addressed to illustrate the
environment that both were working in. This will be
followed by an in-depth breakdown of the CEC into the
functional areas of contracting, public works, NCF, staff,
and others. The breakdown will be done both in the areas of
number of commands and the number of billets.
B. THE MISSION
In 1986 the U.S. military found itself in an extended
confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, known as the Cold War.
Though no one was actually in combat, it could be viewed as
a war of strength and technology. The Soviet Union, the
leaders of the Warsaw Pact, had grown over time to become a
formidable threat to the national security of the U.S. To
combat this threat, the Navy provided a worldwide presence
and had grown to almost 600 ships, over 7,000 aircraft, and
a force of more than a million officers, enlisted personnel,
and civilian employees. To support such a large inventory
of equipment and numbers of personnel, the Navy found it
necessary to operate and maintain a multi-billion dollar
shore establishment. In this context, the CEC received a
mission for both contingency operations for the NCF and a
peacetime mission to manage this massive shore
establishment. (Ref. 8)
Management of the Navy shore establishment is a "cradle
to grave" process. CEC officers are involved from the
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procurement of the real property; planning, programming,
design, and construction of facilities; maintenance and
repair of the facilities over their life; demolition of
facilities; and disposal of real property. (Ref. 8) The
goal of a 600 ship Navy by 1989 and an initiative for
homeporting--spreading the fleet to numerous locations vice
a few for security purposes—placed heavy emphasis on the
CEC in the areas of constructing new facilities and
maintaining a rapidly expanding shore establishment. (Ref.
9)
C. THE CEC
To accomplish the mission, the CEC had an endstrength
of 1764 officers, 2.4 percent of the Navy officer
endstrength. (Ref. 5, 10) To analyze this information it
is necessary to present the functional areas in two ways,
number of commands and number of billets. This will
identify, when comparing to 1996, where cuts can be
attributed.
1 . Commands
The number of commands is indicative of the number of
bases and units being supported and the volume of
construction underway for the functional areas of
contracting, public works, and the NCF. A contracting
office is located to provide construction contracting
capabilities to an area, while a public works office is
located where facilities management is needed. The number
of NCF commands is driven by CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT.
Changes in these command numbers would indicate an
adjustment in the operational expectations of the CEC. Due
to the areas of staff and others being equally represented
26
as both commands and billets, they will only be addressed as
numbers of billets.
a. Contracting
In 1986 the functional area of contracting was
distributed over six Engineering Field Divisions (EFD) , ten
Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) offices, and 104
contracting offices of various sizes. (Ref. 11)
The EFD' s were regionally placed to provide
support to contracting offices. Locations included
Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, San
Francisco, and Pearl Harbor. This was consistent with the
large fleet concentration areas of the times and placed
EFD' s where they could most effectively support the
contracting offices. (Ref. 11)
The OICC comes in two types. The first type is a
group of construction contracting officers put together as a
team for the construction of a specific large MILCON
project. Examples underway in 1986 included Diego Garcia,
Kings Bay, Naval Regional Medical Center San Diego, and the
hospital at Travis Air Force Base. The second type of OICC
works as an administrative support activity similar to an
EFD. It is effectively a smaller version of an EFD and
reports to an EFD. It is sited where there is a large
amount of construction underway, like San Diego at the time,
or is remotely located overseas, like Marianas Guam, the
Philippines, mid-Pacific, the Far East in Yokosuka Japan, or
the Mediterranean. These OICC offices provide the
contracting offices with a much more immediate and local
response than the EFD can. (Ref. 11)
There were 104 contracting offices worldwide in
1986. The offices ranged in size from a single officer at a
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small command to ten or more officers supporting a large
concentration area. (Ref. 11)
b. Public Works
As with contracting, there are three types of
public works commands—Public Works Centers (PWC) , Public
Works Departments (PWD) , and Staff Civil Engineer (SCE)
offices
.
The PWC are typically located where there is a
large concentration of fleet activities. The idea is that a
consolidated command can provide better support to more
activities than many small PWD's. At the time PWC's could
be found in nine locations around the world--Great Lakes,
Norfolk, Pensacola, San Diego, San Francisco, Pearl Harbor,
Yokosuka, Guam, and the Philippines. (Ref. 11)
A PWD is located at large commands and provides a
full range of public works support for the command. Due to
their size and responsibility, these offices usually have
more than one CEC officer assigned, and for large commands
often times have three to five. In 1986 there were 148
PWD's around the world. (Ref. 11)
The SCE, in contrast to the PWD, is typically a
small office with just one CEC officer. The SCE is a
liaison office with a PWC or large PWD and has little in-
house capabilities. The support received for the command
comes from outside, therefore a smaller office is
sufficient. In 1986 there were 104 SCE offices located at
large customer activities supported by a PWC or large PWD.
(Ref. 11)
c. NCF
The NCF is under the operational control of
CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT. To support these two
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operational commanders, the NCF maintains Pacific and
Atlantic forces which mirror one another. This can be seen
by the fact that there are two each of Brigades, Regiments,
Amphibious Construction Battalions and Underwater
Construction Teams, one assigned to the Atlantic and one to
the Pacific. Anomalies to this logic are the nine Mobile
Construction Battalions, four Pacific and five Atlantic, and
the three Construction Battalion Centers, located in
California, Mississippi, and Rhode Island. (Ref. 11)
2. Billets
The second way to segregate the CEC is to use a strict
count of the number of billets in each functional area.
Figure 5 illustrates the actual number of billets and the
percentage for each functional area in 1986. The data
indicate that more than half of the billets were devoted to
contracting and public works, with a guarter going to the











Figure 5: DISTRIBUTION OF CEC BILLETS, 1986 (Ref. 11)
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D. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has provided two breakdowns of the same
information so that it may be easily compared with the CEC
of 1996. The next chapter will accomplish this same
breakdown of the 1996 CEC structure, followed by an analysis
of how the CEC has changed over this period.
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IV. THE POST COLD WAR CEC
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine the CEC of the post Cold War,
using 1996 as a representative year. As in Chapter III, the
mission of the Navy and the CEC will by addressed, followed
by a breakdown of the CEC into the functional areas
previously identified. This will permit an analysis between
the two structures of the CEC for the represented years in
the following chapter.
B. THE MISSION
The early 1990' s brought significant change to the
world, the nation, and the military. With the collapse of
Communism and the falling of the Berlin Wall came a
contraction and confusion regarding the mission of the U.S.
military. Where there was once a single visible threat to
defend against, there was now a series of unknowns as to
potential adversaries. Without the familiar threat of the
Warsaw Pact, the military lacked focus. The mission of
sustaining two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts
emerged. The endstrength of the military could not be
justified on this mission, and it was forced to become
smaller
.
From a peak of 2,174,100 personnel in FY87, the
military shrank to 1,471,700 personnel in FY96, a 32 percent
cut. (Ref. 12) Savings were not only expected in personnel,
but in infrastructure as well. The Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) commission recommended consolidating and
closing facilities in 1991, 1993, and 1995 in an attempt to
save money. The construction related to relocating
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functions has put increased demands on the CEC for
contracting and disposing of bases to communities.
C. THE CEC
To accomplish its mission, the CEC had an endstrength
of 1469 officers, 2.6 percent of the Navy officer
endstrength. (Ref. 5, 10) As with the 1986 data, the 1996
data will be presented in the functional areas of
contracting, public works, NCF, staff, and other, both for
number of commands and number of billets.
1 . Commands
The first broad based perspective on reductions is to
look at the number of commands and how this has changed.
Reduction in the number of commands can occur in only one of
three ways: Closure of the base being supported, such as
through the BRAC process; consolidation of the unit being
supported with another unit already having a CEC command,
such as when the Naval Aviation Depot consolidated to fewer
locations; or consolidation of the CEC command itself with
another CEC command, such as the case of numerous PWD' s in
Washington, D.C. combining to become a singular PWC . The
number of commands present in contracting, public works, and
NCF for 1996 will be broken down to establish the framework
for comparison in the next chapter.
a. Contracting
In 1996 the functional area of contracting saw the
creation of two new types of commands to go with the already
present EFD, OICC, and contracting offices. The two new
commands were the Engineering Field Activity (EFA) , similar
to the stateside administrative OICC in San Diego in 1986,
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and the BRAC office, established to execute the final
disposal of real property for a base closure. (Ref. 7)
At the EFD, EFA, and OICC level, the CEC realigned
and continues to change its structure. In 1996 five EFD'
s
were still in place at Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston,
San Diego, and Pearl Harbor. Philadelphia, although still
an EFD in name, reports through the Norfolk EFD and has
become a smaller command. (Ref. 7)
By 1996 five EFA' s had been created to support
areas having large amounts of construction. The Washington,
D.C. and San Francisco offices were scaled down from an EFD
to an EFA. The OICC in the Mediterranean was switched in
name to an EFA but continued to operate as it did in 1986.
EFA offices were created at Great Lakes and Poulsbo,
Washington to support the increased activity in these areas.
Administrative OICC's remained in Yokosuka and Guam. The
only construction contracting OICC in 1996 was located in
Portsmouth, Virginia to build the new Naval Hospital. (Ref.
7)
Also created by 1996 were ten BRAC offices to
support the closure of bases after the last tenants depart.
Five of these offices were located in the San Francisco Bay
Area, with the others located at Warminster, PA, Charleston,
SC, Glenview, IL, Los Angeles, CA, and the U.S. territory of
Guam. As an activity scales down, the CEC officer becomes
one of the last military members on board and is responsible
for disposing of the real property. The billet that remains
is a hold over from the command whose billets have been lost
and will go away upon completion of the mission of disposal.
(Ref. 7)
The number of contracting offices remaining in
1996 was ninety. The function of these offices remained the




The function of the public works has not changed
since 1986. There still remains three types of commands
supporting this functional area--PWC, PWD, and SCE.
The number of PWC's increased to ten by 1996, but
will soon be back to nine with the closure of the San
Francisco PWC in the near future. Two new PWC's were opened
in Jacksonville, FL and Washington, D.C., while the
Philippines PWC closed. The remainder have not changed
since 1986. (Ref. 7)
The number of PWD and SCE offices has gone down to
122 and 94 respectively since 1986. A few of these cuts can
be attributed to consolidation with PWC s in Washington and
Jacksonville, but most have been due to base closures and
consolidation of commands being supported. (Ref. 7)
c. NCF
The NCF has changed the least in its command
structure since 1986. Based on a continuing requirement to
support two operational commanders, the CEC has retained two
Brigades, Regiments, Amphibious Construction Battalions, and
Underwater Construction Teams, one for each of the two
commanders. The anomalies of 198 6 have been changed through
the closure of the Construction Battalion Center in Rhode
Island, and the decommissioning of an Atlantic Mobile
Construction Battalion. (Ref. 7)
2. Billets
Figure 6 illustrates the actual number of billets and
the percentage for each functional area in 1996. The data
indicate that more than half of the billets remain devoted
to contracting and public works, with a quarter still going
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to the NCF and staff. This illustrates only a slight shift
in the distribution of billets and indicates no effort to












Figure 6: DISTRIBUTION OF CEC BILLETS, 1996 (Ref. 7)
D. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has provided the same descriptive
breakdown of the structure of the CEC in 1996 as was
previously provided for 1986. The next chapter will analyze
these two sets of data to determine where the changes have
occurred and explain them.
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V. AN ASSESSMENT OF CHANGE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will use the information provided in the
previous two chapters to illustrate how the CEC has
implemented the reductions in endstrength. The CEC has gone
from a force of 1,764 in 1986 to 1,469 in 1996. A
determination of how the mission has changed, if at all, to
allow this 17 percent reduction in CEC endstrength will be
made. A comparison will then be conducted to determine how
the CEC reductions compared to those taken by the entire
Naval Officer community. A complete analysis will then
follow to determine if cuts were realized by shrinking the
command structure, the size of CEC commands, or a
combination of the two.
B. THE MISSION
The actual mission of the Navy has changed little since
the end of the Cold War, but the threats it must face to
meet the mission have. The Navy is, as always, responsible
for maintaining open sea lanes and projecting a forward
presence. But the threat is no longer a singular, large
adversary with an open water capability. The threat now
comes from smaller adversaries that do not threaten the open
seas as the Soviet Union did for years. To face this change
the Navy has moved to a smaller force capable of not only
providing a presence on the open seas, but able to provide
amphibious and over the horizon support in coastal
operations
.
As a result of a smaller operational force, it has
become necessary for support functions and activities to
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also become smaller. To this end there has been a reduction
in the number of bases through the BRAC process. Because it
is a political process, the reduction in bases is not
proportional to the cuts in operational forces. Section
VIII of the Quadrennial Defense Review states that while the
total military endstrength has been reduced 32 percent from
1989 to 1997, the result of all base closures will only
reduce the infrastructure a total of 26 percent. (Ref. 13)
Through this change in Naval doctrine, the CEC has seen
no real change in mission. Operationally, the CEC continues
to provide advanced base construction during contingency
operations for both CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT, and in base
support, the CEC provides the Navy with professional
engineer capabilities in construction contracting and public
works maintenance.
Operationally, a change in the way the Navy meets its
mission could directly affect the NCF, but five of the six
operational command types contain only one unit each in the
Atlantic and Pacific. A cut in one of these commands would
degrade the capability of one of the fleet commanders, and
therefore would not be expected unless there were very large
cuts being made in Naval capabilities.
In the area of support, a change in the way the Navy
meets its mission can only indirectly affect the CEC size.
In construction contracting and public works maintenance,
the size of the fleet and the endstrength of the line
community can only affect the CEC size through an associated
change in infrastructure. In theory, fewer ships need fewer
bases, hence a smaller CEC to build, operate, and maintain
bases. But this fails to recognize the necessary
intermediate step of base closures commensurate with
platform reductions which, as noted above, has not yet
occurred.
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C. THE CEC AND THE NAVY
Figure 7 shows both the total number of naval officers
and the total number of CEC officers for the years 1986 to
1998. (Ref. 5, 10) Note that the number of naval officers
must be read from the left hand scale, while the number of
CEC officers must be read from the right hand scale. The
CEC make up less than three percent of the total naval
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Figure 7: TOTAL NUMBER OF NAVAL AND CEC OFFICERS, 1986-1998
(Ref. 5,10)
Figure 7 illustrates that there have been definite cuts
in endstrength for both the naval officer and CEC
communities. While cuts have been made, a close look shows
that the two have not moved downward together. This
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disconnect is critical, as it illustrates that the CEC
endstrength is not directly linked to the naval officer
endstrength. The CEC endstrength may still be loosely
connected to total naval officer endstrength, but it must be
influenced by some other factor such as infrastructure as
well
.
Figure 8 depicts the CEC as a percent of the naval
officer community for the years 1986 to 1998. (Ref. 5, 10)
This once again illustrates that while the CEC may be
loosely controlled by the total naval officer endstrength,
only moving in a range of 2.3 to 2.6 percent, the CEC
endstrength must be ultimately dictated by another factor.
YEAR
Figure 8: CEC AS A PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NAVAL OFFICER
COMMUNITY, 1986-1998 (Ref. 5, 10)
To explain the movement over time it is necessary to
recognize that two events are occurring simultaneously. The
denominator is the naval officer endstrength and the
numerator is the CEC endstrength. While both of these
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communities have seen cutbacks, it is differences in the
severity of the cutbacks that create the change in the
percentage
.
Between 1986 and 1988 there is a movement from 2.4 to
2.3 percent. Over this period it is seen that the navy
officer community was still growing to meet the goal of a
600 ship Navy by 1989. On the other hand the CEC became
slightly smaller as large projects like Kings Bay, GA and
Diego Garcia were being completed. The cumulative effect of
two small movements in opposite direction resulted in a
lowering of the CEC as a percentage.
The CEC remained at 2.3 percent from 1988 to 1993, but
there were events that must be noted as changes in CEC
endstrength still occurred. Between 1988 and 1990 the CEC
saw slight growth that can be attributed to the FY88 BRAC.
However, the CEC change was too small to drive a change in
the percentage. By 1991 the CEC was able to realize some of
the cuts from completing the 1988 closures. Simultaneously,
the naval officer community began the Post Cold War drawdown
and once again the cumulative effect was a stable CEC to
toal naval officer ratio. In 1992 and 1993 a similar
pheneomenon of simultaneous CEC and naval officer downsizing
occurred.
Although the drawdown for the Navy had hit its peak by
1994, the naval officer community took its largest cuts from
1994 to 1996. Over the same period the CEC was feeling the
effects of an excessive number of base closures from a
series of BRAC commissions for FY91, FY93, and FY95. This
culminated in the CEC actually having a very slight growth
in endstrength for 1996. The cumulative effect of the large
cuts in the naval officer endstrength and modest to no cuts
in CEC endstrength resulted in a growth to 2.6 percent for
the CEC.
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The CEC expects that naval officer endstrength will be
slightly reduced in 1997 and 1998 and then level off for the
future. (Ref. 5) On the other hand, the CEC itself is
expected to begin realizing billet cuts from the base
closures for the FY91, FY93, and FY95 BRAC processes. As
would be expected a few years beyond the BRAC year bases
begin closing and CEC billets are lost. The effect of the
CEC experiencing their largest cuts while the naval officer
community stabilizes results in the percentage of CEC
officers moving back down to 2.3 percent.
While this information suggests that base closures are
linked to the downsizing of the CEC, it is necessary to
analyze the command and billet structures to support this
hypothesis
.
D. REDUCTIONS IN THE CEC
There are two ways to recognize cuts in the CEC. There
can be a reduction in the number of commands through closure
or consolidation, or there can be a reduction in the number
of billets at a command. By comparing the number of
commands and billets in the five functional areas of
contracting, public works, NCF, staff, and other for 1986
and 1996, the methodology for implementing cuts can be
determined. Figure 9 shows in table form the changes that
have occurred in the number of commands from 198 6 to 1996
for the functional areas of contracting, public works, and
NCF. Commands and billets are very similar for the areas of





COMMAND TYPE 1986 1996 CHANGE
CONTRACTING EFD 6 5 (1)
EFA 5 5
CONTRACTING
OFFICES 114 93 (21)
BRAC OFFICES 10 10
PUBLIC WORKS PWC 9 10 1
PWD 148 122 (26)
SCE 104 94 (10)
NCF NCB 2 2
NCR 2 2
NMCB 9 8 (1)
ACB 2 2
UCT 2 2
CBC 3 2 (1)
CBU 22 20 (2)
Figure 9: NUMBER OF CEC COMMANDS WITHIN EACH FUNCTIONAL
AREA FOR 1986 AND 1996 (Ref. 7
, 11)
Figure 10 provides in table form the number of billets
that existed in each functional area in 1986 and 1996. (Ref.
7, 11) This is broken down to illustrate the number of
billets working within each type of command to see where the










CONTRACTING EFD/EFA 81 69 (12)
CONTRACTING
OFFICES 441 289 (152)
BRAC OFFICES 18 18
TOTAL 522 376 (146) 28%
PUBLIC WORKS PWC 111 109 (2)
PWD/SCE 481 382 (99)
TOTAL 592 491 (101) 17%
NCF NCB 26 27 1
NCR 12 13 1
NMCB 126 120 (6)
ACB 16 16
UCT 6 6
CBC 14 11 (3)
CBU 22 20 (2)
CBMU 1 (1)
RESERVE
STAFFS 22 3 (19)
TOTAL 245 216 (29) 12%
STAFF NAVFAC HQ 50 40 (10)
NFESC/NCEL 14 15 1
USN STAFFS 104 91 (13)
USMC STAFFS 3 5 2
JOINT STAFFS 20 22 2
SECRETARIAT
STAFFS 8 10 2
EXCHANGE
BILLETS 6 5 (1)
TOTAL 205 188 (17) 8%
OTHER TOTAL 200 198 (2) 1%
TOTAL CUTS 1764 1469 (295) 17%
Figure 10: NUMBER OF BILLETS WITHIN EACH TYPE OF COMMAND
FOR 1986 AND 1996 (Ref. 7, 11)
44
The next section will use this command and billet
breakdown to determine their relationship to the downsizing
of the CEC.
E. DRIVING THE CHANGE
Using the data provided in Figures 9 and 10, each
functional area will be analyzed to determine what factors
influenced the downsizing. The goal will be to see if the
cuts can be related to base closures and consolidations or
if they were the result of an attempt to meet an artificial




The contracting area consists of two levels of
commands. The administrative level is the overhead commands
of EFD' s and EFA's, while the working level consists of the
contracting and BRAC offices. Because they have different
functions, they appear to have lost billets through
differing circumstances.
The EFD/EFA level had a reduction of 12 billets that
can not be directly tied to office downsizing or command
closure. At this level there was a definite reorganization
that affected the endstrength, but it can not be directly
explained. There was a reduction of one EFD and a creation
of five EFA's. Simultaneously the average size of the EFD
was reduced, but since there were no EFA's in 1986, their
creation was a 100 percent increase in command size. The
net reduction of 12 can not be directly tied to command
closure or billet reduction at the command, and will
therefore be explained as administrative reorganization.
The contracting offices are a different matter in that
the 152 billet reduction can be explained by two distinct
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factors. The number of contracting commands has been
reduced by 21 and the average size of a contracting office
went from 3.87 billets per office to 3.11 billets per
office. Thus it is possible to attribute 81 (53 percent) of
the billets to the reduction in the number of commands and
71 (47 percent) of the billets to the reduced number of
billets in each office.
2 . Public Works
Public works, like contracting, has two distinct levels
of operation. The PWC is very large and supports a broad
area. The PWD and SCE, on the other hand, are small and
support a single base or command. This difference is
reflected in the way cuts in billets are taken at each
level
.
The PWC appears to have grown in number from nine to
ten and shrank in billets by two. However, a closer look
shows the PWC in San Francisco is down to just five
personnel and will be closing soon. Once this occurs, it
will become apparent that the PWC's have really taken less
than one billet cut per command on average, not grown to ten
commands with fewer billets. Due to its size the PWC has
been able to take a small reduction in billets without
taking cuts in the number of commands.
Due to the size of PWD' s and SCE offices, they must
close commands to realize savings in the number of billets.
The average number of billets per office in 1986 was 1.91,
down to 1.77 in 1996. Having an average size of less than
two billets requires command closure in most circumstances
to reduce the number of billets. Of the 99 billets lost in
this area 69 (70 percent) billets can be attributed to the
closing of 36 offices while only 30 (30 percent) billets can
be attributed to smaller offices.
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3. NCF
In the NCF area there were 29 billets cut, 12 (41
percent) of which can be attributed to command closure.
Between 1986 and 1996 one NMCB, one CBC, one CBMU, and two
CBU' s were decommissioned to realize savings in personnel.
The remainder of the cuts were made through a reorganization
of the reserve NCF and the number of active personnel
necessary to support them.
4 . Staff
The staff functional area is made up of two commands,
NAVFAC Headquarters and Naval Facilities Engineering Support
Center (NFESC) , and numerous positions on the staffs of
other commands. The NFESC had an increase of one billet
while the NAVFAC HQ had a 10 (20 percent) billet cut. This
was done strictly through reorganization and is considered a
direct reduction in billets at the command.
During this period there was a reduction of billets on
Naval Staffs while there was an increased representation of
the CEC on Marine Corps, Joint, and Secretariat Staffs. It
is likely that joint operations have become more prevalent
and the need for CEC expertise is necessary in these staff
areas. The reduction in the support to Navy staffs is not
due to a reduction in CEC on a staff, as there are typically
two or fewer CEC on a staff, but as a result of fewer staffs
to support through consolidation. Since 198 6 the Navy has
attempted to reduce overhead throughout the organization,
and to this end has consolidated many staffs.
5 . Other
There has been a negligible change in the number of
billets in this area. The makeup of this functional area
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fluctuates with the season as students move in and out of
schools, personnel PCS, and accessions and separations move
in and out of the CEC. This category is the catch all to
allow for these seasonal fluctuations to keep the actual
number of personnel in the CEC under the authorized
endstrength.
F. CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent that there is no direct link to the
naval officer community dictating the size of the CEC. An
analysis of the drawdown for both the CEC and the naval
officer community does not show a congruence between the
two. There may be an understanding that the CEC will not
grow out of proportion to the group it supports. But at the
same time, there does not appear to be an expectation that
the CEC will be kept at a definitive level. It makes sense
that the CEC should not grow disproportionatly, as its
mission is a small part of the Navy, but it should also not
be constrained arbitrarily.
A closer look within the CEC itself supports this
disconnect from the entire naval officer community. The
internal cuts have not been arbitrarily across the board,
but can be partially explained by base closures. The Navy
includes large commands, with over ten personnel, and small
ones, featuring fewer than ten personnel. The CEC is made
up of a few large commands (EFD's, PWC's, NAVFAC HQ) and
hundreds of small commands (contracting offices, PWD's,
SCE's, staff commands) having one to four personnel. It is
generally believed that large commands can afford to lose a
billet, and numerous large commands losing one billet add up
to big cuts. The CEC has very few of these large commands




Fifty-one percent of total CEC cuts over the ten year
period resulted from command closures, and, arguably,
another ten percent due to consolidation of Reserve and Navy
staffs. Only thirty-nine percent of all cuts came from
downsizing (as opposed to closing) commands. The NAVFAC HQ
and the EFD' s were able to make a few cuts, but the majority
came from reducing the average size of the contracting
offices and PWD' s to 3.11 and 1.77 respectively. It would
be extremely difficult to make these numbers any smaller.
It does not appear to be feasible for the CEC to reduce
any further without additional infrastructure cuts. Over the
next few years the CEC will continue to reduce endstrength
as a result of the completion of past BRAC decisions. In
the future, further cuts will also have to be associated
with closures or CEC representation at commands will be





The Cold War has come to a close and significant cuts
have been made to U.S. military forces. The unknown aspect
of this drawdown has been the implementation of these cuts
on small portions of the military structure, specifically
the CEC.
This thesis has identified the command and billet
structure for the CEC for 1986 and 1996. These two years
are used to represent the Cold War and the transition to the
Post Cold War. The data have provided some insight into the
logic behind the cuts and indicated if there was a plan in
implementation or an arbitrary methodology. Egually
important, an illustration of how cuts in CEC endstrength
were made during this period provides insight into the
impact of future cuts. This analysis allows decision makers
in DoD, DoN, and Congress to avoid arbitrary cuts by
illustrating the link between the CEC endstrength and the
size of the infrastructure.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . How has the end of the Cold War and the subsequent
downsizing of the military affected the CEC size and
structure?
The end of the Cold War has presented the military as a
whole and the CEC specifically with an opportunity to
downsize. Through comparisons with the entire naval officer
community, it is seen that the CEC has lagged in the
drawdown. This is a positive aspect in that it illustrates
that the CEC is not being arbitrarily constrained as a
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percentage of the naval officer community, but is downsizing
as a response to other, more objective factors. The
analysis suggests that two factors have driven the reduction
in the CEC size— a reduction in infrastructure and a general
downsizing of large commands.
2. How has the end of the Cold War affected the
mission of the CEC?
The CEC mission has changed little over its history.
The CEC continues to be responsible for construction
management, facilities maintenance, and advanced base
construction. This was the mission prior to the Cold War,
during the Cold War, and today. The changes that occur are
not in the mission itself, but rather, a function of changes
in the Navy' s infrastructure within which this mission is
pursued.
3. How are the size and structure of the CEC managed
in relation to the mission?
As noted above, the mission is unchanged, but the
infrastructure within which it is pursued has been
downsized. This thesis demonstrates a linkage between the
shrinking infrastructure and the CEC drawdown, not a linkage
between a smaller naval officer endstrength and the CEC
drawdown.
4. Who is managing the cuts in CEC endstrength and how
are the cuts being implemented?
It has been determined that the CEC only controls and
budgets for about one half of all the CEC billets. The
remaining half are distributed among other major claimants
in the Navy. It is the responsibility of the Billet Manager
for the CEC to ensure that a proper mix of billets is
maintained to allow growth of well rounded CEC officers. It
appears that the CEC has proven itself capable and necessary
to the Navy community it supports as cuts appear to be
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logical extensions of base closures and consolidations and
not arbitrary to meet some desired endstrength number.
5. Have the increased requirements for deployments to
regional conflicts, joint staffing, base closure, and
increased environmental awareness been considered in the
changes to the CEC structure?
It is not possible to determine exactly what criteria
were considered over the past ten years of cuts. It does
appear though that cuts have been driven from the bottom up,
and not directed from above. The cuts made have been in
step with base closures and increases in billets to joint
and Marine Corps staffs have been allowed. This illustrates
the ability of the CEC to determine endstrength on needs and
not arbitrary ceilings.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The data presented in command and billet structures
show a CEC that has become smaller in both areas. The
connection to the naval officer endstrength appears to be
loose or indirect; the endstrength of the CEC is more
closely tied to the size of the infrastructure. This
connection is critical because an arbitrary connection to
naval officer endstrength could easily drive the CEC to such
a small size as to be unable to accomplish its mission.
It has also been shown that the CEC has cut the size of
some offices to accomplish the reduction. These small cuts
have now reduced the size of many commands to a point of
being unable to remove any further personnel without
actually closing the office. As the military experiences
cuts in the future, it must reduce infrastructure first to
realize any further savings in personnel within the CEC.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. A study needs to be done to determine if CEC
billets within contracting offices were replaced by
civilians
.
Contracting offices are staffed with both military and
civilian personnel. The junior contract administration
billets can be filled by either a civilian or an officer.
This thesis has shown that about one half of the cuts in
contracting offices came from closures, with the other half
the result of downsizing the offices. This thesis focused
on the CEC, hence it did not detect changes in civilian jobs
at these commands. The question that is raised is whether
or not the reduction in CEC billets resulted in actual
savings, or a shift to civilian jobs.
2. A study should be performed to determine the
consequences to the CEC of outsourcing functions.
This thesis has shown that PWD' s have an average size
of 1.77 billets. Would the outsourcing of this function
cause these billets to go away, or would they become
administrators of the outsourced contract? There is no
doubt that it would affect civilian jobs, but what would be
the impact to the CEC?
3. A study should be completed to identify if a
similar pattern of reductions has occurred to both the CEC
and civilians in NAVFAC as a result of base closures.
This thesis viewed only the CEC billets as they
pertained to the drawdown. The next logical step would be
to look at the CEC and civilians within the organization.
The functional areas of NCF and other are almost exclusively
CEC, but the areas of contracting, public works, and staff
are heavily influenced by the number of civilians. In these
functional areas a study needs to be accomplished to
determine if the cutbacks to the organization as a whole are
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moving with the base closures as the CEC endstrength does,
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